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Abstract
When implementing an economic institution in the field or in the laboratory, the
participants’ action spaces and the institution’s outcomes are typically discrete, while our
theoretical analysis of the institution often assumes the sets are continuous. Predictions by
the continuous model generally turn out to be good approximations to the performance of
the discrete implementation. We present an example in which the continuous version has a
unique and Pareto efficient equilibrium, but in which the discrete version often has vastly
more equilibria, many of them far from efficient. We show that the same phenomenon
appears in two experiments investigating the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, and that it may
account for the experimental results.
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‡University of Arizona Email: mwalker@arizona.edu
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Experimental Economics (for Swarthout) and from the National Science Foundation (for Walker).
1 Introduction
A common practice in economics, as in other fields, is to use continuous models to ana-
lyze phenomena that are essentially discrete. The characteristics and the predictions of the
continuous model generally turn out to be good approximations to the associated discrete
phenomena. It’s also well understood that the differences between continuous and discrete
versions of a model can sometimes matter – as in a simple Cournot model, for example, where
the continuous version can have a unique equilibrium while the discrete version can have
several pure strategy equilibria.
We present an example in which the usual correspondence between continuous and discrete
versions of the same model fails dramatically. The example is a simple economy with a
public good, in which the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Groves and Ledyard (1977)) is used to
determine how much of the public good will be provided and how much each participant will
pay to finance the public good. The economy has no pathological features: consumers have
quasi-linear utility functions and the public good is produced at constant marginal cost. If
participants have continuous action spaces (i.e., if each participant’s set of available actions
is an interval in R), the mechanism will have a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium will
be Pareto optimal. But when participants’ action spaces are discrete, we will see that the
mechanism typically has multiple pure-strategy equilibria – often an enormous number of
them – and there is nothing to single out any of the equilibria as focal. In further sharp
contrast with the continuous model, only a small fraction of the equilibria in the discrete
model may be Pareto optimal.
Under a broad class of parametrizations of the mechanism the resulting noncooperative
game is supermodular; this is true whether the action spaces are continuous or discrete. When
the action spaces are continuous, this supermodularity ensures that any “adaptive” behavior
by the participants will converge to the unique, Pareto optimal equilibrium (Milgrom and
Roberts (1990)). But when the action spaces are discrete and the set of equilibrium outcomes
therefore generally quite large, supermodularity no longer guarantees efficient outcomes.
The dramatic difference between the performance of the continuous and the discrete ver-
sions of the mechanism in our example is of more than theoretical interest: in order to
implement any economic mechanism – whether in an experiment or in a naturally-occurring
economic setting – one has to use discrete strategy spaces. The results we present suggest that
one could easily go wrong using the continuous model to make predictions about outcomes in
a discrete implementation. After analyzing our example, we briefly describe two experimental
studies of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism in which these issues are especially germane.
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2 The Model
There are two goods, which we’ll call X and Y ; we denote quantities of the goods by x
and y. Good X is a public good, which can be produced and provided to consumers by using
Y as input: it takes c units of Y to provide each unit of X. We index the n participants in the
economy by i (i = 1, ..., n). Each person’s preference is represented by a quasi-linear utility
function ui(x, yi) = aix− bix2 − yi, where yi is the amount of good Y person i contributes to
the production of X. It’s convenient to think of Y as money and yi as i’s dollar contribution
to financing the production of X. In order to fully cover the cost cx of providing x units of
the public good, the values of x and y1, ..., yn would have to satisfy
∑
i
yi = cx. We assume
that each person is endowed with enough of the Y good that the allocations we consider are
all interior – i.e., no one’s yi ever exceeds his endowment.
It is easy to show (for example, via the Samuelson condition
∑
i
MRSi =MC) that Pareto
efficiency requires
(1) x = 12B (A− c) and (2)
∑
i
yi = cx,
where A :=
∑
i
ai and B :=
∑
i
bi.
We assume that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is used to determine the levels of x and
y1, ..., yn: each person submits a vote or message mi ∈ R, and then
(3) x =
∑
i
mi and (4) yi = 1ncx+
γ
2 [
n−1
n (mi − µ−i)2 − σ2−i],
where γ > 0 is an exogenous parameter of the mechanism, and where µ−i and σ2−i are defined
as follows:
µ−i := 1n−1
∑
j 6=i
mj and σ2−i :=
1
n−2
∑
j 6=i
(mj − µ−i)2.
Groves and Ledyard (1977; henceforth G&L) established, for very general economies, that
the Nash equilibria of this mechanism are Pareto efficient. In the economies we are considering
here, with quasi-linear utility functions and a linear cost function, it is straightforward to verify
that equations (3) and (4) yield equation (2), and that for any value of the parameter γ there
is a unique Nash equilibrium, which satisfies equation (1) and is therefore Pareto optimal.
While the parameter γ has no effect on the efficiency of the equilibrium nor even (in our
quasi-linear world) on the equilibrium value of x, it may affect the mechanism’s performance
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in other ways. This has been the focus of recent research on the Groves-Ledyard mechanism,
and it will be our focus here as well.
The value of γ affects in particular the supermodularity of the mechanism (more precisely,
the supermodularity of the game defined by the mechanism together with the participants’
utility functions). With the quasi-linear utility functions in our example, participant i’s payoff
function has increasing differences if and only if 1 γ > 2nbi; therefore the game is supermodular
if and only if
γ > 2nmax{b1, ..., bn}. (S)
This necessary and sufficient condition for supermodularity holds for any message spaces that
are compact subsets of R.
Applying results in Section 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990; M&R), if the mechanism
has a unique equilibrium and Condition S is satisfied, then any adaptive dynamic process
will converge to the equilibrium. Moreover, whether the equilibrium is unique or not, if the
message spaces are finite then Condition S ensures that there will exist a time after which the
message n-tuple (m1, ...,mn) will always lie between the smallest and largest equilibria of the
mechanism defined by γ.
3 A Numerical Example
Assume that the mechanism has only three participants, with utility functions
u1(x, y1) = 8x− 12x2 − y1, u2(x, y2) = 10x− 12x2 − y2, u3(x, y3) = 15x− 12x2 − y3,
and that c = 3 is the per-unit cost of producing the public good. We have
MRS1 = 8− x, MRS2 = 10− x, MRS3 = 15− x,
and the Pareto efficient provision level of the public good is therefore x = 10. Because
b1 = b2 = b3 = 12 , the game defined by the Groves-Ledayard mechanism is supermodular if
and only if γ > 3.
3.1 Continuous message spaces
Suppose that each participant, when choosing his message mi, is allowed to choose any
real number. It’s straightforward to solve for the game’s unique Nash equilibrium, which is
1This is shown via some straightforward but tedious algebra, contained in an appendix.
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m1 = 103 − 3γ , m2 = 103 − 1γ , m3 = 103 + 4γ .
The equilibrium yields the Pareto efficient public good level x = 10 no matter what value is
assigned to the parameter γ when specifying the mechanism.
3.2 Discrete message spaces
Now assume that each participant’s message space is discrete. In the continuous case it
was straightforward to solve analytically for the equilibria and to verify that the equilibrium
is always unique, but here we have to resort to computation – brute force computation. We
place bounds on the discrete message spaces, to make them finite, and then we evaluate every
profile of messages to determine whether any participant, by deviating to a different message,
can increase his utility. The profiles from which no one has a utility-improving deviation
are the Nash equilibria. With discrete message spaces, unlike the continuous case, it turns
out that the number of Nash equilibria and their efficiency properties depend critically upon
the details of the mechanism – the value of the mechanism’s parameter γ, and the message
space(s) the mechanism makes available to the participants.
Consider first the case in which the only available messages are the integers. In equation
(4), the second term in the expression for yi imposes a “penalty” on person i for choosing a
message mi that differs from µ−i, the mean of the others’ messages. The penalty is increasing
in both |mi − µ−i| and γ, so it’s not surprising that when γ exceeds a certain threshold,
every participant’s best response (if messages are discrete) is the nearest integer to his µ−i.
With the utility functions in our example, that threshold is approximately γ = 13.5. When
γ is larger than this, the only Nash equilibria are symmetric profiles, profiles in which all
three participants choose the same message. And as we increase γ, more and more of these
symmetric profiles become equilibria.
The relation between γ and the number of equilibria is described in detail in Table 1 and
Figure 1. When γ ≤ 13.5 there is generally a single equilibrium, which is asymmetric and at
which m1 +m2 +m3 = 10: the public good is provided at the Pareto efficient level x = 10,
and the total surplus is the maximum possible, 150. For 14 ≤ γ ≤ 22 there are two equilibria,
m1 = m2 = m3 = 3 and m1 = m2 = m3 = 4, with corresponding (non-Pareto) provision
levels x = 9 and x = 12. The amounts of surplus at these levels of x are 148.5 and 144,
respectively. As γ is increased, the number of equilibria grows, always with m1 = m2 = m3,
until eventually every symmetric profile is an equilibrium. (Table 1 and Figure 1 include only
0 ≤ mi ≤ 10, reflecting the bounds we placed on the message spaces.) Of course, as smaller
and larger levels of x become supportable as equilibrium outcomes, the surplus achieved at
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some of the equilibria becomes very much smaller, as can be seen in the rightmost column of
Table 1.
Refining the message space eliminates neither the proliferation of equilibria nor the much
lower surplus generated by many of the equilibria. If we allow each participant to use messages
with one decimal place, Figure 2 shows how the number of equilibria increases with γ, and
Figure 3 depicts the surplus achieved at the “worst” equilibrium for each value of γ. Note
that there are again only a few rather isolated integer values of γ at which the equilibrium is
unique, and that the number of equilibria eventually increases approximately linearly with γ.
However, the mechanism achieves a near-maximum level of surplus here for a broader range of
γ-values than it does when using integer messages: compare Figure 3 and the rightmost column
of Table 1, in which the surplus begins to fall off badly at smaller values of γ. Nevertheless,
the surplus eventually falls off rather dramatically here as well, just as in the integer case.
4 Two Experimental Papers
Two experimental studies of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism demonstrate how these issues
can arise in practice. Chen and Plott (1996; C&P) and Chen and Tang (1998; C&T) report on
experiments in which subjects participated in the GL mechanism in economic environments
that closely parallel our example.
Like our example, each experiment was an instance of the model defined above in Section
2. Each experiment consisted of several experimental sessions; in each session five subjects
participated in a version of the GL mechanism (in the notation of Section 2, n = 5). Each
participant was assigned parameter values ai and bi as described in Table 2.2 In C&P the unit
cost of the public good was c = 5; in C&T it was c = 20. Thus, the unique Pareto efficient
amount of the public good in C&P is x = 5 and in C&T it is x = 25.
In each experiment there were two kinds of sessions, or treatments: in some sessions the
value of the parameter γ was “small” (γ = 1), and in the others γ was “large” (γ = 100).
In the two “large γ” treatments (which we denote by CP-100 and CT-100) the game defined
by the mechanism and the utility functions is supermodular; in the two “small γ” treatments
(CP-1 and CT-1) the game is not supermodular.
Suppose for a moment that the participants’ message spaces are continuous. Then, as
in Sections 2 and 3, the GL mechanism has a unique Nash equilibrium and the amount of
2C&T explain that the parameter values and message space in their experiment were a transformation of
the ones in their paper. We use the ones from the experiment.
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the public good at the equilibrium is the Pareto efficient amount. We refer to these as the
continuous-space equilibria; they are shown in Table 3.
But of course the message spaces in the experiments were not continuous. In the C&P
experiment the message space consisted of the nine integers −2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; in C&T
it consisted of the 51 integers −20,−19,−18, . . . , 28, 29, 30. Consequently, just as in the
example presented above in Section 3, the equilibrium is unique for only some values of γ and
for other values of γ there are many equilibria. This multiplicity of equilibria is important for
interpreting the experimental results.
Those results can be described in a nutshell as follows: In treatment CT-100 the subjects’
choices in each session converged quickly to the integer profile nearest to the continuous-
space equilibrium in Table 3, the profile (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5) = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5); the public good
was therefore provided at the Pareto efficient level. In CP-100 the subjects generally chose
messages relatively near the ones in Table 3, but did not coordinate on any particular profile
of messages. In both CP-1 and CT-1 the subjects’ choices never seemed to converge, and the
public good level was generally not the Pareto amount.
If the equilibrium in each treatment were unique, a plausible explanation of these results
would be the supermodularity of the γ = 100 treatments and the lack of supermodularity in
the γ = 1 treatments.
However, the same computational approach used in Section 3 reveals that only one of the
treatments, CT-100, actually has a unique equilibrium. Tables 4 and 5 describe how the set
of equilibria depends upon the value of γ in the two experiments, just as Table 1 does for our
example. In particular, the treatment CT-1 has not one equilibrium, but 1,445. While all
1,445 equilibria yield the Pareto amount of the public good, we might expect subjects to have
a difficult time coordinating on or converging to any particular one of them. In CP-1 there
are nine equilibria, all of them again Pareto efficient, but the multiplicity might still make it
difficult for subjects to arrive at any particular one of the equilibria.
Thus, the experimental subjects’ failure to converge to any consistent pattern of behavior
in these two “small γ” treatments was likely a consequence of the multiplicity of equilibria
and not due to the lack of supermodularity. Indeed, even if the games in these treatments
were supermodular, that would guarantee only that adaptive behavior will eventually lie in
the rectangle bounded by the extreme equilibria (cf. Theorem 8 of Milgrom and Roberts
(1990)). With so many equilibria, that would allow for an enormous range of behavior.
Behavior in the two “large γ” treatments was more orderly, and supermodularity likely
played a role. The game in treatment CT-100 is supermodular and the equilibrium is unique.
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Adaptive behavior will therefore eventually attain and remain at the equilibrium; indeed, the
game is dominance solvable. Moreover, the equilibrium is a symmetric profile which might be
quite focal to subjects. The rapid convergence of the subjects’ observed behavior is therefore
quite consistent with theoretical prediction.
The case of CP-100 is a little bit different than the other three. Here the mechanism
is supermodular, like CT-100, but there are five equilibria – the five symmetric profiles
(−1,−1,−1,−1,−1), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2, 2, 2), and (3, 3, 3, 3, 3). Theorem 8
of M&R (see especially the theorem’s second corollary) ensures that any adaptive dynamics
will eventually yield only profiles in the rectangle bounded by the two extreme equilibria –
i.e., each participant’s message mi will be one of the five integers -1, 0, 1, 2, or 3, but the par-
ticipants will not necessarily all choose the same integer. This is consistent with the extremely
limited description of the data that appears in C&P.3
5 Supermodularity and Multiplicity of Equilibria
The emphasis in both C&P and C&T is on the importance of choosing a large value for
the parameter γ in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. C&T’s Proposition 1, they say, provides
a sufficient condition for the convergence of the mechanism in quasi-linear environments,
and thus gives “the precise range of γ that induces stability under a wide class of learning
dynamics.”
The sufficient condition in C&T’s Proposition 1 is equivalent to our Condition S:4 if
γ/2n is larger than max{b1, ..., bn}, then the mechanism is supermodular for the participants’
particular utility functions. It’s not the mechanism itself that’s supermodular, but the game
induced by the mechanism together with the participants’ preferences for the public good.
Is it possible for the mechanism’s designer to specify a value for the parameter γ that
will “work” for any set of participants? It might appear from Condition S that the answer is
effectively yes: while we clearly can’t choose a value for γ that will work for all possible values
of b1, b2, . . . , bn, we could perhaps choose a γ so large that no plausible bi will exceed γ/2n.
3Having found explicitly all the equilibria in the two C&P treatments, it would be extremely informative
to compare the equilibria with the disaggregated raw data, especially in the supermodular treatment CP-100.
At this writing, however, the authors of C&P have been unable to recover the raw data from the experiment.
4Proposition 1 in C&T appeals to a result in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that requires differentiability; it
therefore applies only when message spaces are continuous (i.e., compact intervals), not to the discrete message
spaces in the C&P and C&T experiments. The direct proof we provide in an appendix applies to any compact
message spaces in R and establishes that Condition S is both necessary and sufficient for supermodularity.
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Choosing a very large value for γ will ensure supermodularity. But the examples in
Sections 3 and 4 above suggest that if γ is large enough to induce supermodularity for all
plausible preferences, many of those preferences are likely to be ones for which the GL mech-
anism has multiple equilibria – perhaps many equilibria, and many of them far from efficient.
Guaranteeing supermodularity is of little use when this is the case.
A positive interpretation of these results is possible, as well, however: if we know enough
about the participants’ preferences in advance, it may be possible to choose a value for γ that
produces both supermodularity and a unique equilibrium – and the C&T experiment suggests
that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is likely to produce good outcomes in cases like this.
6 Conclusion
Economic analysis is carried out more often than not with continuous models, while imple-
mentation requires discreteness. This distinction is generally ignored because there is typically
a close correspondence between the continuous and the discrete models’ predictions. However,
the example we’ve presented, and the two experiments that exhibit the same phenomenon as
the example, suggest that this close correspondence can fail and the two models’ predictions
can differ rather dramatically. This possibility requires particular attention when uniqueness
of the model’s equilibrium is important.
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Appendix
For each i = 1, . . . , n let Si be a compact subset of R and let Ui : S → R, where S =
S1 × . . .× Sn. This defines a normal form game U = (U1, . . . , Un). The game U is said to be
supermodular if each Ui has increasing differences, to be defined below. The definition
of supermodularity includes several requirements in addition to increasing differences (see
Milgrom & Roberts (1990)); each of these additional requirements is satisfied here as an
immediate consequence of the compactness of each Si in R and the continuity of each Ui.
For any mi, m˜i ∈ Si and m−i, m˜−i ∈ ×j 6=iSj , let
∆Ui(m˜i,mi,m−i) = Ui(m˜i,m−i)− Ui (mi,m−i)
and ∆2Ui (m˜,m) = ∆Ui(m˜i,mi, m˜−i)−∆Ui(m˜i,mi,m−i)
= [Ui(m˜i, m˜−i)− Ui (mi, m˜−i)]− [Ui(m˜i,m−i)− Ui (mi,m−i)].
Definition: Ui has increasing differences if ∆2Ui (m˜,m) ≥ 0 whenever m˜ ≥m.
Let Ui(m) = vi(x(m))− yi(m), where x(m) and yi(m) are given by (3) and (4) in Section 2:
x(m) =
∑
i
mi and yi(m) =
1
n
cx+
γ
2
[
n− 1
n
γ[(mi − µ−i)2 − σ2−i].
Writing M−i for
∑
j 6=i
mj , we have
Ui (m) = vi (mi +M−i)− 1
n
c (mi +M−i)− n− 1
n
(γ
2
) (
m2i − 2µ−imi + µ2−i
)
+
γ
2
σ2−i
and therefore
∆Ui (m˜i,mi,m−i) =
[
vi (m˜i +M−i)− 1
n
c (m˜i +M−i)
− n− 1
n
(γ
2
) (
m˜2i − 2µ−im˜i + µ2−i
)
+
γ
2
σ2−i
]
−
[
vi (mi +M−i)− 1
n
c (mi +M−i)
− n− 1
n
(γ
2
) (
m2i − 2µ−imi + µ2−i
)
+
γ
2
σ2−i
]
= vi (m˜i +M−i)− vi (mi +M−i)− 1
n
c (m˜i −mi)
− n− 1
n
(γ
2
) (
m˜2i −m2i − 2µ−i (m˜i −mi)
)
.
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Similarly,
∆Ui (m˜i,mi, m˜−i) = vi
(
m˜i + M˜−i
)
− vi
(
mi + M˜−i
)
− 1
n
c (m˜i −mi)
− n− 1
n
(γ
2
) (
m˜2i −m2i − 2µ˜−i (m˜i −mi)
)
Therefore
∆2Ui (m˜,m) = vi
(
m˜i + M˜−i
)
− vi
(
mi + M˜−i
)
− vi (m˜i +M−i) + vi (mi +M−i)
+
n− 1
n
(γ
2
)
[2µ˜−i (m˜i −mi)− 2µ−i (m˜i −mi)] .
The last term in the expression above can be simplified to
n− 1
n
γ (µ˜−i − µ−i) (m˜i −mi) = n− 1
n
γ
(
1
n− 1M˜−i −
1
n− 1M−i
)
(m˜i −mi)
=
1
n
γ
(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(m˜i −mi) ,
so that
∆2Ui (m˜,m) = vi
(
m˜i + M˜−i
)
− vi
(
mi + M˜−i
)
− vi (m˜i +M−i) + vi (mi +M−i)
+
1
n
γ
(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(m˜i −mi) .
If vi (x) = ax− bx2 then the four vi(·) terms in the above expression each have the form
vi (mi +M−i) = a (mi +M−i)− b
(
m2i + 2M−imi +M
2
−i
)
,
and we have
vi (mi +M−i)− vi (m˜i +M−i) = a (mi +M−i)− a (m˜i +M−i)
+ b
(
m˜2i −m2i + 2M−im˜i − 2M−imi
)
= a (mi − m˜i) + b
(
m˜2i −m2i
)
+ 2bM−i (m˜i −mi) ,
and similarly
vi
(
m˜i + M˜−i
)
− vi
(
mi + M˜−i
)
= a (m˜i −mi) + b
(
m2i − m˜2i
)
+ 2bM˜−i (mi − m˜i) .
Therefore the four vi(·) terms in the expression for ∆2Ui (m˜,m) yield
vi
(
m˜i + M˜−i
)
− vi
(
mi + M˜−i
)
− vi (m˜i +M−i) + vi (mi +M−i) =
= a (m˜i −mi) + a (mi − m˜i) + b
(
m2i − m˜2i
)
+ b
(
m˜2i −m2i
)
+ 2b
(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(mi − m˜i)
= 2b
(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(mi − m˜i) ,
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and we have
∆2Ui (m˜,m) = 2b
(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(mi − m˜i) + 1
n
γ
(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(m˜i −mi)
=
(
1
n
γ − 2b
)(
M˜−i −M−i
)
(m˜i −mi) .
The payoff function Ui(·) therefore has increasing differences if and only if γ > 2nb, and the
game U = (U1, . . . , Un) is supermodular if and only if
γ > 2nmax{b1, b2, . . . , bn}.
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# of Common Messages mi Provision Levels of the Smallest
Gamma Equilibria in Equilibria Public Good (x) Surplus
γ = 1 3 mi not all the same 10 150
2 ≤ γ ≤ 13 1 mi not all the same 10 150
14 ≤ γ ≤ 22 2 3, 4 9, 12 144
23 ≤ γ ≤ 31 4 2, 3, 4, 5 6, 9, 12, 15 112.5
32 ≤ γ ≤ 40 6 1, … , 6 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 54
41 ≤ γ ≤ 49 8 0, …, 7 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 -31.5
50 ≤ γ ≤ 58 9 0, …, 8 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24 -144
59 ≤ γ ≤ 67 10 0, …, 9 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27 -283.5
68 ≤ γ 11 0, …, 10 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30 -450
Table 1: Equilibria in the example (integer messages)
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Figure 1: The number of equilibria (integer messages)
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Figure 2: The number of equilibria (one-decimal-place messages)
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Figure 3: Surplus at the worst equilibria (one-decimal-place messages); the dashed line is at
the maximum attainable surplus, 150
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Subject ai bi ai bi
1 ‐1 0 5.2 0.04
2 5 0.5 20.8 0.32
3 10 0.9 7.6 0.08
4 20 1.8 16.4 0.24
5 15 1.2 12 0.16
C&P C&T
Table 2: Preference parameters in the C&P and C&T experiments
Treatment γ m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 x
Continuous‐space
Equilibrium
CP‐1 1 ‐1 0 1 2 3 5
CP‐100 100 .98 .99 1 1.01 1.02 5
CT‐1 1 ‐15 25 ‐5 15 5 25
CT‐100 100 4.8 5.2 4.9 5.1 5 25
Table 3: Continuous-space equilibria in the C&P and C&T experiments
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Common messages
i NE i i l l f h bli d ll lγ #NE mi n  Prov s on  eve s o  t e pu c goo sma est surp us
1 9  mi not all the same 5 110
2 4  mi not all the same 5 110
3 2  mi not all the same 5 110
4 0
5 ≤ γ ≤ 31 1 1 5 110
32 ≤ γ ≤ 38 2  mi not all the same 5, 9 39.6
39 ≤ γ ≤ 43 2 1, 2 5, 10 0
44 ≤ γ ≤ 83 3 0, 1, 2 0, 5 10 0
84 ≤ γ ≤ 87 4 0, 1, 2, 3 0, 5, 10, 15 ‐330
88 ≤ γ ≤ 127 5 ‐1, … , 3 ‐5, 0, 5, 10, 15 ‐330
128 ≤ γ ≤ 132 6 ‐1, … , 4 ‐5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 ‐880
133 ≤ γ ≤ 172 7 ‐2, … , 4 ‐10, ‐5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 ‐880
173 ≤ γ ≤ 217 8 ‐2, … , 5 ‐10, ‐5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 ‐1650
218 ≤ γ 9 ‐2, … , 6 ‐10, ‐5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 ‐2640
Table 4: Equilibria in the C&P experiment
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γ # NE
Common 
messages 
mi in NE
Smallest
surplus
1 1445 mi not all the same 25 525
2 97 mi not all the same 25 525
3 54 mi not all the same 25 525
4 22 mi not all the same 25 525
5 9 mi not all the same 25 525
6 14 mi not all the same 25 525
7 4 mi not all the same 25 525
8 3 mi not all the same 25 525
9 2 mi not all the same 25 525
10 3 mi not all the same 25 525
11 ≤ γ ≤ 13 1 mi not all the same 25 525
14 ≤ γ ≤ 17 2 mi not all the same 25 525
18 ≤ γ ≤ 35 1 mi not all the same 25 525
36 ≤ γ ≤ 46 0
47 ≤ γ ≤ 129 1 5 25 525
130 ≤ γ ≤ 229 2 5, 6 25, 30 504
230 ≤ γ ≤ 329 3 4, 5, 6 20, 25, 30 504
330 ≤ γ ≤ 429 4 4, 5, 6, 7 20, 25, 30, 35 441
430 ≤ γ ≤ 529 5 3 , 4 , … , 7 15 , 20 , … , 35 441
530 ≤ γ ≤ 629 6 3 , 4 , … , 8 15 , 20 , … , 40 336
630 ≤ γ ≤ 730 7 2 , 3 , … , 8 10 , 15 , … , 40 336
731 ≤ γ ≤ 829 8 2 , 3 , … , 9 10 , 15 , … , 45 189
830 ≤ γ ≤ 929 9 1 , 2 , … , 9 5 , 10 , … , 45 189
930 ≤ γ ≤ 1029 10 1 , 2 , … , 10 5 , 10 , … , 50 0
1030 ≤ γ ≤ 1129 11 0 , 1 , … , 10 0 , 5 , … , 50 0
1130 ≤ γ ≤ 1229 12 0 , 1 , … , 11 0 , 5 , … , 55 ‐231
1230 ≤ γ ≤ 1330 13 ‐1 , 0 , … , 11 ‐5 , 0 , … , 55 ‐231
1331 ≤ γ ≤ 1429 14 ‐1 , 0 , … , 12 ‐5 , 0 , … , 60 ‐504
1430 ≤ γ ≤ 1529 15 ‐2 , ‐1 , … , 12 ‐10 , ‐5 , … , 60 ‐504
1530 ≤ γ ≤ 1630 16 ‐2 , ‐1 , … , 13 ‐10 , ‐5 , … , 65 ‐819
1631 ≤ γ ≤ 1729 17 ‐3 , ‐2 , … , 13 ‐15 , ‐10 , … , 65 ‐819
1730 ≤ γ ≤ 1830 18 ‐3 , ‐2 , … , 14 ‐15 , ‐10 , … , 70 ‐1176
1831 ≤ γ ≤ 1929 19 ‐4 , ‐3 , … , 14 ‐20 , ‐15 , … , 70 ‐1176
1930 ≤ γ ≤ 2030 20 ‐4 , ‐3 , … , 15 ‐20 , ‐15 , … , 75 ‐1575
2031 ≤ γ ≤ 2129 21 ‐5 , ‐4 , … , 15 ‐25 , ‐20 , … , 75 ‐1575
2130 ≤ γ ≤ 2230 22 ‐5 , ‐4 , … , 16 ‐25 , ‐20 , … , 80 ‐2016
2231 ≤ γ ≤ 2330 23 ‐6 , ‐5 , … , 16 ‐30 , ‐25 , … , 80 ‐2016
2331 ≤ γ ≤ 2430 24 ‐6 , ‐5 , … , 17 ‐30 , ‐25 , … , 85 ‐2499
2431 ≤ γ ≤ 2530 25 ‐7 , ‐6 , … , 17 ‐35 , ‐30 , … , 85 ‐2499
2531 ≤ γ ≤ 2630 26 ‐7 , ‐6 , … , 18 ‐35 , ‐30 , … , 90 ‐3024
2631 ≤ γ ≤ 2729 27 ‐8 , ‐7 , … , 18 ‐40 , ‐35 , … , 90 ‐3024
2730 ≤ γ ≤ 2829 28 ‐8 , ‐7 , … , 19 ‐40 , ‐35 , … , 95 ‐3591
2830 ≤ γ ≤ 2930 29 ‐9 , ‐8 , … , 19 ‐45 , ‐40 , … , 95 ‐3591
2931 ≤ γ ≤ 3029 30 ‐9 , ‐8 , … , 20 ‐45 , ‐40 , … , 100 ‐4200
3030 ≤ γ ≤ 3130 31 ‐10 , ‐9 , … , 20 ‐50 , ‐45 , … , 100 ‐4200
3131 ≤ γ ≤ 3230 32 ‐10 , ‐9 , … , 21 ‐50 , ‐45 , … , 105 ‐4851
3231 ≤ γ ≤ 3329 33 ‐11 , ‐10 , … , 21 ‐55 , ‐50 , … , 105 ‐4851
3330 ≤ γ ≤ 3430 34 ‐11 , ‐10 , … , 22 ‐55 , ‐50 , … , 110 ‐5544
3431 ≤ γ ≤ 3530 35 ‐12 , ‐11 , … , 22 ‐60 , ‐55 , … , 110 ‐5544
3531 ≤ γ ≤ 3629 36 ‐12 , ‐11 , … , 23 ‐60 , ‐55 , … , 115 ‐6279
3630 ≤ γ ≤ 3729 37 ‐13 , ‐12 , … , 23 ‐65 , ‐60 , … , 115 ‐6279
3730 ≤ γ ≤ 3829 38 ‐13 , ‐12 , … , 24 ‐65 , ‐60 , … , 120 ‐7056
3830 ≤ γ ≤ 3930 39 ‐14 , ‐13 , … , 24 ‐70 , ‐65 , … , 120 ‐7056
3931 ≤ γ ≤ 4029 40 ‐14 , ‐13 , … , 25 ‐70 , ‐65 , … , 125 ‐7875
4030 ≤ γ ≤ 4129 41 ‐15 , ‐14 , … , 25 ‐75 , ‐70 , … , 125 ‐7875
4130 ≤ γ ≤ 4230 42 ‐15 , ‐14 , … , 26 ‐75 , ‐70 , … , 130 ‐8736
4231 ≤ γ ≤ 4329 43 ‐16 , ‐15 , … , 26 ‐80 , ‐75 , … , 130 ‐8736
4330 ≤ γ ≤ 4430 44 ‐16 , ‐15 , … , 27 ‐80 , ‐75 , … , 135 ‐9639
4431 ≤ γ ≤ 4530 45 ‐17 , ‐16 , … , 27 ‐85 , ‐80 , … , 135 ‐9639
4531 ≤ γ ≤ 4629 46 ‐17 , ‐16 , … , 28 ‐85 , ‐80 , … , 140 ‐10584
4630 ≤ γ ≤ 4729 47 ‐18 , ‐17 , … , 28 ‐90 , ‐85 , … , 140 ‐10584
4730 ≤ γ ≤ 4830 48 ‐18 , ‐17 , … , 29 ‐90 , ‐85 , … , 145 ‐11571
4831 ≤ γ ≤ 4929 49 ‐19 , ‐18 , … , 29 ‐95 , ‐90 , … , 145 ‐11571
4930 ≤ γ ≤ 5030 50 ‐19 , ‐18 , … , 30 ‐95 , ‐90 , … , 150 ‐12600
5031 ≤ γ 51 ‐20 , ‐19 , … , 30 ‐100 , ‐95 , … , 150 ‐12600
Provision
levels of the
public good
Table 5: Equilibria in the C&T experiment
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